Assessing the role of contact tracing in a suspected H7N2 influenza A outbreak in humans in Wales. by Eames, Ken TD et al.
Eames, KT; Webb, C; Thomas, K; Smith, J; Salmon, R; Temple, JM
(2010) Assessing the role of contact tracing in a suspected H7N2 in-
fluenza A outbreak in humans in Wales. BMC Infect Dis, 10 (1). p.
141. ISSN 1471-2334
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/3454/
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Creative Commons Attribution http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/
Eames et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010, 10:141
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/10/141
Open AccessR E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
© 2010 Eames et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Research articleAssessing the role of contact tracing in a suspected 
H7N2 influenza A outbreak in humans in Wales
Ken TD Eames*1, Cerian Webb2, Kathrin Thomas3, Josie Smith3, Roland Salmon3 and J Mark F Temple3
Abstract
Background: The detailed analysis of an outbreak database has been undertaken to examine the role of contact 
tracing in controlling an outbreak of possible avian influenza in humans. The outbreak, initiating from the purchase of 
infected domestic poultry, occurred in North Wales during May and June 2007. During this outbreak, extensive contact 
tracing was carried out. Following contact tracing, cases and contacts believed to be at risk of infection were given 
treatment/prophylaxis.
Methods: We analyse the database of cases and their contacts identified for the purposes of contact tracing in relation 
to both the contact tracing burden and effectiveness. We investigate the distribution of numbers of contacts identified, 
and use network structure to explore the speed with which treatment/prophylaxis was made available and to estimate 
the risk of transmission in different settings.
Results: Fourteen cases of suspected H7N2 influenza A in humans were associated with a confirmed outbreak among 
poultry in May-June 2007. The contact tracing dataset consisted of 254 individuals (cases and contacts, of both poultry 
and humans) who were linked through a network of social contacts. Of these, 102 individuals were given treatment or 
prophylaxis. Considerable differences between individuals' contact patterns were observed. Home and workplace 
encounters were more likely to result in transmission than encounters in other settings. After an initial delay, while the 
outbreak proceeded undetected, contact tracing rapidly caught up with the cases and was effective in reducing the 
time between onset of symptoms and treatment/prophylaxis.
Conclusions: Contact tracing was used to link together the individuals involved in this outbreak in a social network, 
allowing the identification of the most likely paths of transmission and the risks of different types of interactions to be 
assessed. The outbreak highlights the substantial time and cost involved in contact tracing, even for an outbreak 
affecting few individuals. However, when sufficient resources are available, contact tracing enables cases to be 
identified before they result in further transmission and thus possibly assists in preventing an outbreak of a novel virus.
Background
On May 23rd, 2007, an outbreak of H7N2 influenza in a
poultry flock was reported in North Wales, UK. The out-
break was subsequently found to have affected birds at
three premises linked to a market held two weeks earlier
in North West England. Several human contacts of
infected birds developed flu-like symptoms, and the fol-
low-up of exposed people and their close contacts was
undertaken, in line with UK guidance [1]. Four individu-
als (two in Wales) were shown to be influenza A, H7 pos-
itive by PCR of whom two (one in Wales) had H7
indistinguishable from the avian strain circulating con-
currently (sequenced as A/Chicken/Wales/2007). Here
we examine the outbreak in Wales and the response car-
ried out by the National Public Health Service for Wales
(NPHS).
Following notification of the avian outbreak by Animal
Health, the UK government agency responsible for live-
stock health, to the public health service, an outbreak
control team was convened to lead the response in accor-
dance with UK and WHO guidelines [1]. The response
included taking contact histories from individuals who
were thought to be cases, and tracing any contacts identi-
fied. At the time, stocks of prophylaxis (oseltamivir) were
limited, thus there was a need to ensure that it was only
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given to those at greatest risk of contracting the virus via
a contact with a potentially infectious individual.
In communicable disease control, contact tracing is
used to link cases together and to identify individuals
who may have been infected, and is recommended in sus-
pected human cases of avian influenza [1]. Contact trac-
ing is particularly useful for identifying cases when it is
unlikely that infected individuals will independently pres-
ent themselves for treatment [2,3]. It was particularly
appropriate in the outbreak described here because of the
non-specific and usually mild symptoms of infection.
Contact tracing is a heavy burden for the public health
service, especially, as here, when it is not clear beforehand
which types of contact may represent a risk. In the
absence of any tools for the rapid confirmation of infec-
tion by the novel virus and limited availability of prophy-
lactic treatment, the judgement of health-care personnel
is the only option to prioritise the response.
A database of the Welsh outbreak was constructed; this
database contained details of all cases, suspected cases,
and contacts and included information, where available
and where relevant, of symptom onset, treatment date,
and type of contact. Data were recorded by the NPHS's
health protection teams working in collaboration with
clinicians in both primary and secondary care settings.
We present an analysis of this database, noting that sus-
pected cases are an important element since they contrib-
uted to the contact tracing burden.
Methods
Case definitions
The outbreak control team used the following case defini-
tions:
A definite case was defined as an individual with labo-
ratory confirmed diagnosis of influenza. A suspected case
was defined as an individual with influenza-like illness
(ILI) or conjunctivitis AND close contact with either an
infected flock, or a definite case, or a suspected case.
ILI was defined as pyrexia (≥38°C) or history of fever
AND respiratory symptoms (cough or shortness of
breath) with myalgia.
Unless stated otherwise, we will use the term "case" to
refer to both definite cases and suspected cases.
Contact tracing
Close human to bird contact was defined as being within
one metre, in a closed environment, with live or dead
affected chickens from an affected farm, OR having vis-
ited a holding, which had birds with confirmed or sus-
pected avian influenza, on any of the 8 days prior to onset
of clinical symptoms.
Close human to human contact was defined as house-
hold contact OR social contact for several hours with a
human case from 24 hours before to 8 days after onset of
that individual's symptoms.
Unless stated otherwise, we will use the term "contact"
to refer to either close human or close bird contact.
Contact tracing was carried out either over the phone
or face-to-face out from all definite cases and suspected
cases. Contact tracing was also carried out from some
other individuals who were thought at the time to be pos-
sible cases. In instances where cases were not identified
until many days after the onset of their symptoms, diffi-
culties with recall meant that it was not possible to iden-
tify all of their encounters; all reasonable efforts were
made to ensure that contact histories were as complete as
possible.
In order to assist in the assessment of the probability of
transmission from a "case" to a contact, contacts were
divided into three categories, representing expected
decreasing levels of risk: home, work, and other. "Home"
describes the location where the patient usually slept;
"work" describes the patient's place of work (or educa-
tion); "other" contacts includes encounters with individu-
als who were on the same hospital ward or the same
doctor's surgery as cases. Not all interactions fitted neatly
into these categories; in such instances, the most appro-
priate option was chosen.
The offer of prophylaxis to contacts was made to those
who met the definition of a close contact in the opinion of
the health professional examining them. Contacts who
were not traced until many days after their exposure and
who were then still without symptoms were not given
treatment.
Social networks
The outbreak and the contact tracing efforts can be visua-
lised by plotting the social contact network of the out-
break; such a network plots individuals as points and
joins with lines those individuals who have been linked
through contact tracing [4,5]. Plotting the outbreak as a
network has been used to assist in the identification of
individuals likely to be at increased risk of infection, and
aids the evaluation of the likely source of infection [6,7].
Results
Once the public health service had been alerted to the
outbreak, on May 23rd, contact tracing was carried out
from individuals who were thought to be cases. By the
end of May 27th full contact histories had been obtained
from 12 individuals. The 142 distinct contacts identified
were telephoned and those with symptoms were exam-
ined by a specially convened team of local general practi-
tioners, all using Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
Field epidemiology, including obtaining the history of
both clinical symptoms and contacts, was carried out by
the outbreak control team and collated by the support
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team from the Communicable Disease Surveillance Cen-
tre (Wales).
One week after the initial notification, 20 individuals
who were thought to be cases and 236 distinct contacts
had been identified. Contact tracing and the administra-
tion of antiviral drugs were continued where necessary,
and the outbreak was declared over on June 5th 2007.
Subsequently, either on the basis of alternative virologi-
cal diagnoses being confirmed by laboratory tests (one of
parainfluenza 3 and one of rhinovirus) or as further infor-
mation became available indicating that that the individ-
uals concerned had had no exposure to infected birds nor
to other cases, the total number of human "cases" in the
Welsh outbreak was reduced to 14.
In total, contact tracing was carried out from 86 people
and 3 groups of livestock (2 flocks and one market). The
14 "cases" identified 281 contacts (not all distinct) while
72 others, who were subsequently determined not to be
cases, identified 337 contacts (not all distinct). In total,
254 distinct individuals (cases and contacts) were identi-
fied. 102 individuals were given treatment or prophylaxis;
86 courses of antiviral drugs were provided. The control
and contact tracing efforts involved approximately 60
public health personnel.
The cases and contacts identified were linked together
through a network of social contacts (Fig 1). The network
displays the wide variability in the number of contacts
identified by this population: while many individuals had
low numbers of potentially risky contacts, other individu-
als were extremely well connected (Table 1, Fig 2), a result
observed in many other epidemiologically relevant net-
works [5,6,8]. As might have been anticipated, the range
in number of contacts identified was lowest at home,
whilst some individuals identified large numbers of con-
tacts at work and "other" locations.
Once contact tracing began in earnest, it rapidly caught
up with the spread of infection (Table 1, Fig 3). In an ideal
scenario, infected individuals would be identified imme-
diately they displayed symptoms (perfect surveillance)
and all contacts would be traced immediately they had
been identified (instantaneous tracing), but in reality this
is never possible. It is hard to quantify the impact of any
delays in contact tracing when the inherent properties of
the infection (latent period, transmissibility, potential for
transmission before onset of symptoms) are unknown. In
this case, the public health imperative was to assume the
worst case scenario of a previously unencountered
human infection. In Fig 3 we see how quickly those traced
individuals eventually treated or given prophylaxis could
have been reached in the idealised case of perfect surveil-
lance and instantaneous tracing (of course, we would
anticipate that under conditions of perfect surveillance
and instantaneous tracing the outbreak would have
ended sooner and the number of doses of treatment/pro-
phylaxis would have been reduced). We see that the prin-
cipal hold-up came from the two week delay in
recognition of the outbreak in poultry, with its potential
risk to humans. Contact tracing, once the potential seri-
ous public health implications were realised, was
extremely rapid.
In this outbreak the response was sufficient for tracing
efforts to catch up with suspected infection, so that later
cases were treated almost immediately they exhibited
symptoms (Table 1, Fig 4). Assuming that person-to-per-
son spread could have occurred, this aided control by
reducing both the opportunity for ongoing infection and
the number of contacts that needed to be traced.
If all the human cases were indeed caused by the same
infective agent, such as H7N2 influenza, the most
straightforward explanation of the epidemiological data
from case interviews is that 3 infections were acquired
directly from infected birds, 4 from household contacts, 6
from workplace contacts and 1 from other contacts. Since
the cases identified a total of 36, 63, and 182 home, work,
and other contacts respectively, this allows us to estimate
the probability of transmission in the three different set-
tings as 0.11, 0.095, and 0.0055. Unsurprisingly, contacts
at home appear to be the most risky, with those at work
also considerably more risky than those in "other" set-
tings. We can use these estimates and the details of the
contacts identified by each case to estimate the number
of secondary cases that each case might be expected to
generate (Table 1, Fig 4) [9]. As anticipated, there is con-
siderable heterogeneity; the expected number of second-
ary cases ranges from 0.1 to 2.7. Such an exercise helps to
highlight those individuals who, in the event of person-
to-person spread, might be expected to have caused fur-
ther cases. That cases late in the epidemic generated few
secondary cases could be explained as the result of the
speed with which they were contacted by the outbreak
control team. Being treated rapidly after symptoms
appeared or receiving prophylaxis before symptoms
appear would, in general, in any disease in which person-
to-person spread occurred, be expected to reduce the
opportunity to infect contacts.
Discussion
The outbreak occurred in a highly heterogeneous popula-
tion, both in terms of contact structure and risk for fur-
ther spread. Home and workplace contacts accounted for
most of the suspected cases, with "other" settings being
far less risky. The heterogeneities seen are partly due to
behavioural differences and partly due to variation in
speed of diagnosis. For instance, case 1 was hospitalised
but not isolated for almost a fortnight before being diag-
nosed and therefore acquired an unusually large number
of contacts (although none became cases). School pupils
or teachers similarly would usually be expected to have
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had many contacts [10], but fortunately the main out-
break took place over a Bank Holiday weekend and subse-
quent half term holiday.
Difficulties in obtaining data and mobilising personnel,
and the fact that the outbreak in poultry did not immedi-
ately come to light, meant that infection initially spread
with the public health service having little idea where it
was. The problem was exacerbated by the non-specific
nature of the symptoms of the infection, which meant
that some cases were not identified until they had been
traced from other cases. However, once the outbreak was
detected, contact tracing allowed the rapid identification
of at-risk individuals. This reduced the delay between the
onset of symptoms and the application of treatment/pro-
phylaxis; contact tracing could be plausibly identified as
having lowered opportunities for further spread.
Resources for contact tracing were locally stretched in
the few days following the notification of the outbreak.
However, the outbreak control team was able to draft in
the extra resources required; contingency plans were in
place to allow further support to be enlisted from other
parts of Wales, but this was not necessary. There were
limited supplies of prophylactic treatment at the time of
Table 1: Summary data of cases, dates of symptom onset, times to treatment, numbers of contacts, and estimated 
secondary cases in the absence of treatment.
Case Date of symptom 
onset (days after 
May 1st)
Days between 
appearance of 
symptoms and 
treatment
Number of contacts identified Estimated secondary cases 
in the absence of treatment
Home Work Other
1 11 13 3 4 69 1.1
2 17 7 1 2 4 0.3
3 18 6 3 1 4 0.5
4 20 4 4 3 5 0.8
5 21 3 4 14 53 2.1
6 22 3 2 1 0 0.3
7 22 7 3 1 0 0.4
8 23 3 3 23 29 2.7
9 25 0 1 14 13 1.5
10 26 0 1 0 2 0.1
11 26 1* 4 0 3 0.5
12 28 1 2 0 0 0.2
13 28 0 3 0 0 0.3
14 28 0 2 0 0 0.2
*prophylaxis was contraindicated in this individual; symptoms were identified 1 day after appearance and the individual ceased social 
activities at this point.
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the outbreak, although this is no longer the case as the
worldwide production and stock has increased.
It was not clear that there was a single source of infec-
tion, as there was laboratory confirmation of Influenza A
in only 2 of the "cases". It is possible that there were sev-
eral unrelated causes of their symptoms, and hence it is
possible that more than one organism accounted for the
pattern of illness observed in this social network.
It is not clear whether H7 Influenza A, as observed
here, is sufficiently infectious to have spread widely had it
been allowed to proceed without any attempt being made
at control. Indeed, some doubt whether avian influenza
strains including this one can spread from person to per-
son at all. In this outbreak, due to the lack of diagnostic
Figure 1 Outbreak network. Network showing the individuals and 
poultry involved in the outbreak and the links identified between 
them. The network contains 254 individuals, (including 2 cases in poul-
try (squares), 14 human cases, and 72 other individuals from whom 
contact tracing was carried out). Cases and links between cases are 
shown in red. Those other individuals from whom contact tracing was 
carried out and their links to cases are shown in blue. Other individuals 
and links are shown in grey.
Figure 2 Population variability in number of contacts identified. 
For each point on the x-axis, the black line shows the number of peo-
ple (out of the 86 individuals from whom contact tracing was carried 
out) who identified at least that many contacts. The red, green, and 
blue lines show the same for home, work, and other contacts respec-
tively.
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Figure 3 Actual and idealised time courses of treatment and trac-
ing. Time course of tracing and treatment/prophylaxis during the out-
break (blue). Also shown are two idealised situations: one - 
instantaneous tracing (green) - in which tracing and treatment/pro-
phylaxis take place immediately a contact is named; the other (red) in 
which there is both instantaneous tracing and perfect surveillance, 
such that as soon as individuals become symptomatic they are treated 
and their contacts are identified and traced.
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Figure 4 Time-ordered network of linked cases showing estimat-
ed secondary infections in absence of treatment. The 14 human 
cases (circles), along with the infected market and flock (squares), plot-
ted from left to right in time ordered position; also shown are traced 
links between them categorised as home (red), work (green) and other 
(blue). Links involving birds are in black. The colour of a circle shows the 
length of time between the onset of symptoms and treatment being 
given, while the area is proportional to the approximate expected 
number of subsequent cases had they not been treated.
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test results, it is not possible to be certain as to the organ-
ism responsible. Only two patients had positive PCR tests
for H7 and none had diagnostic seroconversion. Never-
theless, the data analysed are consistent with limited
chains of person-to-person transmission, a phenomenon
observed in the Netherlands during an H7N7 outbreak in
2003 [11,12]. Other contemporary North American influ-
enza H7 viruses possess human receptor specificity, sug-
gesting that H7 strains may be more transmissible than
other avian strains [13]. Thus, in any real-time outbreak
of a novel infection, it would be unwise to assume, a pri-
ori, that person to person spread could not occur, espe-
cially given the possibility of successive generations of
human infection evolving to become more efficiently
transmitted [14]; the outbreak described here was there-
fore treated as a novel human influenza strain derived
from an avian source, and therefore illustrates the possi-
ble burden of intervention necessary in future similar
outbreaks.
Conclusions
Any avian influenza virus (whether of high or low patho-
genicity in birds) could be a plausible trigger for a major
human pandemic if it can spread from birds to humans,
spread effectively from person to person, and if it
becomes highly pathogenic in humans. This was the
rationale for the major public health contact tracing
response described here. The same precautionary
response would be required in similar situations in
future. The outbreak thus provides a natural experiment
for interventions that have been envisaged in pandemic
planning for the early stages of pandemic influenza [1].
Contact tracing is a powerful intervention [3,15] that will
always have a role as a means of gathering information
about an epidemic but may not be able to control infec-
tion. Contact tracing can only be carried out effectively
with well-organised personnel, good data management,
and sufficient expertise in the field to make rapid deci-
sions.
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